Airflow CVE Vulnerabilities

A bug in Apache Airflow's auth manager logout handling left previously-issued JWT tokens valid after the user clicked logout in the UI: the logout flow for `FabAuthManager` and `KeycloakAuthManager` did not actually reach the underlying `revoke_token()` call, so the JWT remained accepted by the API

The Event Log detail endpoint `GET /api/v2/eventLogs/{event_log_id}` in Apache Airflow fetched audit-log rows directly by numeric ID after only the generic Audit Log permission check, while the collection endpoint `GET /api/v2/eventLogs` applied per-Dag scoping. An authenticated UI/API user with aud

Exploitation requires the attacker to already be an authenticated Airflow worker holding a valid Log-server JWT issued for at least one Dag. Apache Airflow's Log server authorized JWT tokens against Dag IDs by applying Python's `str.lstrip()` to the requested path segment when verifying the JWT's `s

Apache Airflow's scheduler-side deadline-reference decoder (`SerializedCustomReference.deserialize_reference`) imported and dispatched arbitrary class paths drawn from DAG-author-controlled serialized state without an allowlist or plugin-registry gate. A DAG author whose code reaches the scheduler —

A bug in Apache Airflow's rendered-template field handling caused nested sensitive-key masking (e.g. nested `password` / `token` / `secret` / `api_key` keys inside a JSON template structure) to be bypassed when the rendered field exceeded `[core] max_templated_field_length`: Airflow stringified the

A bug in Apache Airflow's XCom PATCH endpoint `PATCH /api/v2/xcomEntries/{key}` allowed an authenticated UI/API user with XCom write permission on a Dag to set XCom entries under reserved key names (e.g. `return_value`) that the matching POST endpoint already validated against `FORBIDDEN_XCOM_KEYS`.

A bug in Apache Airflow's Variable response masker caused nested-key redaction (triggered by secret-suffixed key names like `password`, `token`, `secret`, `api_key`) to be bypassed when the JSON value's nesting depth exceeded the shared secrets masker's recursion limit: the masker returned the origi

Apache Airflow's official documentation at `core-concepts/dag-run.html` ("Passing Parameters when triggering Dags") showed a verbatim `BashOperator(bash_command="echo value: {{ dag_run.conf['conf1'] }}")` example without any quoting / sanitization warning. Dag authors who copied the pattern verbatim

A bug in Apache Airflow's bulk Task Instances API (`PATCH/DELETE /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/dagRuns/{dag_run_id}/taskInstances`) evaluated authorization against the `dag_id` resolved from the URL path while operating on the `dag_id` / `dag_run_id` extracted from request-body entity fields. An authenticat

Apache Airflow's `JWTRefreshMiddleware` set the JWT auth cookie without the `Secure` flag, so deployments running the Airflow API server behind an HTTPS-terminating reverse proxy (e.g. nginx / Envoy / a managed load balancer that terminates TLS and forwards plaintext to the API server, the default c

The partitioned_dag_runs endpoints in the Airflow UI enforced only asset-level access control, not per-Dag authorization. An authenticated UI/API user with global Asset:read permission could enumerate partition run state, schedule configuration, and asset wiring for Dags they were not authorized to

The structure_data endpoint in the Airflow UI returned external dependency graph nodes for linked Dags without checking whether the caller had read permission on those linked Dags. An authenticated UI/API user authorized for one Dag could enumerate linked Dag IDs and dependency metadata for other Da

A bug in the login redirect route in Apache Airflow allowed authenticated users to craft URLs that bypassed the `is_safe_url` check, enabling redirection from a trusted Airflow domain to an attacker-controlled origin. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.2.2 or later. As a defense-in-d

A Dag author could either (a) create a symlink under their task's log directory pointing to an arbitrary file readable by the API server process (read-path attack — e.g. `/etc/passwd` or `airflow.cfg`) or (b) supply a `task_id` containing `..` sequences accepted by the Task SDK's `KEY_REGEX` (write-

A bug in the GET `/api/v2/connections/{connection_id}` REST API endpoint in Apache Airflow allowed an authenticated UI/API user with Connection-read permission to retrieve secrets stored in a Connection's `extra` JSON blob under field names not present in the redaction allowlist (`DEFAULT_SENSITIVE_

Apache Airflow's SMTP provider `SmtpHook` called Python's `smtplib.SMTP.starttls()` without an SSL context, so no certificate validation was performed on the TLS upgrade. A man-in-the-middle between the Airflow worker and the SMTP server could present a self-signed certificate, complete the STARTTLS

The `access_key` and `connection_string` connection properties were not marked as sensitive names in secrets masker. This means that user with read permission could see the values in Connection UI, as well as when Connection was accidentaly logged to logs, those values could be seen in the logs. Azu

The example example_xcom that was included in airflow documentation implemented unsafe pattern of reading value from xcom in the way that could be exploited to allow UI user who had access to modify XComs to perform arbitrary execution of code on the worker. Since the UI users are already highly tru

Apache Airflow versions 3.0.0 through 3.1.8 DagRun wait endpoint returns XCom result values even to users who only have DAG Run read permissions, such as the Viewer role.This behavior conflicts with the FAB RBAC model, which treats XCom as a separate protected resource, and with the security model d